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Abstract
We model the impact of the transfer price rule (a constraint that re-
quires the downstream division of a vertically-integrated rm to earn at
least a normal rate of return on investment in the counterfactual case that
it pays the same price as a nonintegrated rm for the essential input), re-
jected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Linkline, for the performance of
markets in which an upstream rm provides an essential input to a down-
stream rm with which it may compete in the retail market by vertical
integration. We allow for horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation
in the nal good market. The upstream rms equilibrium distribution
choice (between exclusion, dual distribution, or nonintegration) depends
on relative product qualities. We characterize conditions under which
the transfer price rule alters the upstream rms equilibrium distribution
choice, and develop conditions for the transfer price rule to improve mar-
ket performance.
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1 Introduction
The question of the appropriate antitrust treatment of a vertical price squeeze
(Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp, 2009, p. 273),
. . . when a vertically integrated rm squeezes a rivals margins
between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the
rival and a low output price to consumers for whom the two rms
compete,
is a hoary one,1 central to recent U.S. antitrust2 and EU competition policy3
cases. Many of these cases arise out of the interaction between downstream
rms that supply internet access to nal consumers, using as an essential input
the upstream telecommunications infrastructure of vertically-integrated rms
with which they compete in the downstream market.
The U.S. Linkline4 decision involved just such vertical relationships, be-
tween four California internet service providers (ISPs) of retail DSL (digital
subscriber line) internet access, using wholesale transmission services purchased
from Pacic Bell Telephone Co. (later, and in what follows, AT&T), which itself
provided retail DSL internet access.5
In July, 2003, the ISPs led a private antitrust suit alleging that AT&T had
monopolized and attempted to monopolize the regional DSL market in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (503 F. 3d 876 at 878), among other things by
creat[ing] a price squeeze by charging ISP a high wholesale price in relation to
the price at which defendants were providing retail services.
AT&T sought dismissal in District Court on the ground that since it had no
obligation under the antitrust laws to deal with the ISPs at all, it could not have
monopolized in violation of the Sherman Act if its prices did not permit them
a normal rate of return on investment. The District Court did not accept this
argument, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reverse the District
Court, and AT&T appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the resulting decision, the Supreme Court declined to treat price squeeze
as a distinct business strategy for antitrust purposes, instead decomposing it
1Early U.S. antitrust decisions in which price squeezes were at issue include U.S. v. Corn
Products Rening Co. et al. 234 F. 964 (1916) and U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America et
al. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); on the latter, see Sidak (2008, p. 283, pp. 303-304) and
Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp (2009).
2Among which, ARCO (Atlantic Richeld Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990))
and Weyerhaeuser (Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. 549 U.
S. 312 (2007)). Sidak (2008, Section II.A) reviews U.S. price-squeeze decisions arising in the
telecommunications sector.
3For example, Telefónica (Case COMP/38.784  Wanadoo España v. Telefónica Commis-
sion Decision of 4 July 2007) and Wanadoo (France Télécom SA v Commission Case C-202/07
2 April 2009). See Crocioni and Veljanovski (2003), Bravo and Siciliani (2007) for discussions.
4Pacic Bell Telephone Co. et al. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., et al. 555 U. S.
____ (2009).
5The Linkline decisions treated DSL internet access as the relevant product market. At
this time and in this geographic market, DSL, dial-up, and cable modem were alternatives
available to nal consumers. The outcomes of these decisions did not, however, turn on the
question of product market denition.
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into two parts, each of which could be treated according to existing antitrust
standards. First, the high wholesale price that is the lower prong of a price
squeeze is an exercise of monopoly power, which for antitrust economics is the
ability to control price or exclude competition. The exercise of lawfully obtained
market power does not o¤end U.S. antitrust law (in particular, the Sherman Act
Section 2 prohibition of monopolization).6 Second, the low retail price that is
the upper prong of a price squeeze is monopolization if it is predatory, otherwise
not.7
Along the way to sending the case back to District Court for further proceed-
ings consistent with its guidance, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to
reject application of the transfer price ruleapproach to vertical price squeezes,
an approach suggested by the American Antitrust Institute in a friend-of-the-
court brief.8 The transfer price test would nd monopolization if (555 U. S.
____ 14)
the upstream monopolist could not have made a prot by selling at
its retail rates if it purchased inputs at its own wholesale rates.
When it rejected use of the transfer price test, the Supreme Court did so
without analysis of its impact on retail market performance, simply stating (555
U. S. ____ 14):9
Whether or not that test is administrable, it lacks any grounding
in our antitrust jurisprudence. An upstream monopolist with no
duty to deal is free to charge whatever wholesale price it would
like; antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained monopolies from
charging monopoly prices.
6 It is otherwise for EU competition policy: under Article 102 of the EU Treaty, the mere
exercise of market power is in principle an abuse of a dominant position.
7Under, inter alia, Brooke Group, a price is predatory if it is below an appropriate measure
of unit cost and if the rm charging the price would have an objectively reasonable expec-
tation of recouping prots lost while setting a predatory price. EU competition policy takes
demonstration of a price below unit cost as establishing that a rm expected to be able to
recoup predatory losses; no separate demonstration of recoupment is required to nd that a
price below unit cost abuses a dominant position (Tetra Pak II (Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak
International SA v. Commission 1996 ECR I-5951) { 44, Wanadoo.)
8One author of this paper is a member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust
Institute. He was not involved in any way in preparation of the aforementioned brief.
9The European Commission has applied the transfer price rule, although not by that name.
See Motta and de Streels (2006, pp. 118-120) discussion of British Sugar (Commission De-
cision of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown-British Sugar, OJ L 284 [1988]; quoting { 66 of the
Commission decision, A company which is dominant in the market for both a raw material
and a corresponding derived product may not maintain a margin between both prices which
is insu¢ cient to reect that dominant companys own costs of transformation with the result
that competition in the derived product is restricted) and Deutsche Telekom (Commission
Decision of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263 [2003], quoting { 107 of the Commis-
sion decision, there is an abusive margin squeeze if the di¤erence between the retail prices
charged by the dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors
for comparable services is negative, or insu¢ cient to cover the product-specic costs to the
dominant operator of providing its own retail services on the downstream market).
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Our goal in this paper is to model the equilibrium choice of distribution
arrangement by an upstream, and possibly vertically integrated, rm, the re-
sulting market performance, and to model the impact of the transfer price rule
on the choice of distribution mode and on market performance.
We outline our basic analytical framework in Section 2. In Section 3 we
analyze the upstream rms equilibrium choice of distribution mode if it is not
subject to the transfer price rule. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of
the transfer price rule for the upstream rms equilibrium choice of distribution
mode and for market performance. Section 5 concludes. Details of results are
given in the Appendix; derivations are available from the authors on request.
2 Setup
We model a vertically-structured market in which one rm, rm A, is the
monopoly supplier of an essential input for production of a nal good. We
suppose that one unit of the essential input is required to produce one unit of
the nal product, and that the essential input is produced at constant marginal
cost, which, for simplicity, we normalize to be zero. We further assume that
the downstream market is supplied by at most one nonintegrated rm. Vertical
price squeezes have been an issue in cases where the downstream market is a
small-numbers oligopoly. By focusing on the limiting case of one downstream
rm, we avoid highlighting horizontal relationships among downstream rms at
the expense of the vertical relationships in which we wish to focus.10
2.1 Sequence
There are at most three stages in the market (Figure 1). In stage I, rm A
chooses one of three distribution modes (Figure 2). It may choose to fully inter-
nalize distribution, refusing to supply the downstream rm with the essential
input and so excluding the downstream rm, rm B, from the nal good mar-
ket. It may choose dual distribution, integrating downstream and competing
with rm B, to which it supplies the essential input at wholesale price !B
(where B is a demand parameter and a measure of product quality). The
third distribution mode is nonintegration: rm A operates only upstream, and
supplies nal demand using the distribution services of rm B, which again pur-
chases the essential input at wholesale price !B and is the monopoly supplier
to the nal good market.
In stage II, which occurs only if rm A opts for dual distribution or nonin-
tegration, rm A sets wholesale price !B .
11 We assume that rm B enters the
10Carlton (2008) discusses (without formally presenting) a similar model. By allowing
at most one independent downstream rm, we also rule out hold up e¤ects in vertical
relationships of the kind considered by Hart and Tirole (1990).
11We treat constructive refusal, in which rm A announces that it will supply the essential
input to rm B at a price that makes it uneconomic for rm B to purchase the essential input,
as a form of exclusion. Thus if rm A opts for duopoly distribution, it sets a wholesale price
that maximizes rm As value, assuming that rm B earns at least a normal rate of return on
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I II III
Firm A selects
distribution mode
If nonintegration or
dual distribution,
rm A selects !
Active rms
set prices
Figure 1: Sequence of decisions.
Exclusion
UA
........................
....
pA
DA B
....................................
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
Dual Distribution
UA
DA
........................
....
pA
........................
....
pB
B
.............................
!B
Nonintegration
A
B
......................
.....
!B
................
.....
pB
Figure 2: Alternative distribution modes.
downstream market if entry will allow it to earn at least a normal rate of return
on investment.
Finally, in stage III, rms that are active in the downstream market set prices
to maximize own present-discounted value over all future time. If there is dual
distribution, prices are set non-cooperatively. The game is solved backward.
2.2 Demand
If rms A and B supply the downstream market, they do so with horizontally-
and vertically-di¤erentiated varieties. We model downstream demand with the
Spence-Dixit-Vives linear demand specication. The inverse demand equation
investment.
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for variety i is12 ;13
pi = i  
1
N
 
iqi + 
p
ABqj

: (2)
Here i is the maximum reservation price for variety i, which we interpret as a
measure of quality. Equation (2) thus allows for vertical product di¤erentiation.
This specication can be derived from a discrete choice model in which each of
N consumers, uniformly distributed by reservation price from 0 to i, purchases
one unit of a variety if its price is less than the consumers reservation price
(Martin, 2009). In this model, N is a measure of market size. , which lies
between zero and one, measures horizontal substitutability between the two
varieties.
In what follows, we work with the demand equations implied by (2),
qA =
N
1  2

1 R   pA
A
+ R
pB
B

(3)
for rm A and
qB =
N
1  2

1  
R
  pB
B
+

R
pA
A

: (4)
for rm B, where
R =
r
B
A
(5)
is a measure of relative product quality and indicates the extent of vertical
product di¤erentiation.
2.3 Cost
If rm i enters the downstream market, it incurs a completely sunk entry cost
Ei (i = A;B) and a xed cost Fi per unit time period. It also incurs a constant
marginal cost per unit of output for all inputs other than the essential input
produced by rm A. To highlight the impact of vertical input pricing, and for
notational simplicity, we normalize marginal cost to be zero.
3 Alternative Distribution Regimes
We rst consider rm As equilibrium choice of distribution mode, and resulting
market performance, if the transfer price rule is not in place.
12Henceforth, let it be understood that the subscripts i; j refer to i; j = A;B and i 6= j.
13 Inverse demand equations of this form can be derived from a quadratic social welfare
function
U = H + AqA + BqB  
1
2
1
N
 
Aq
2
A + 2
p
ABqAqB + Bq
2
B

; (1)
where N , the number of consumers, is a market size parameter, and H is a Hicksian numeraire
good produced at unit cost under constant returns to scale.
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Exclusion Nonintegration
! NA 12
qA
1
2N NA
qB NA 14N
p 12A
3
4B
r
N VA
1
4A   kA 18B
r
N VB NA
1
16B   kB
r
NCS
1
8A
1
32B
r
NNSW
3
8A   kA 732B   kB
Table 1: Exclusion and nonintegration outcomes.
3.1 Exclusion
If rm A internalizes the distribution function, it sets price to maximize its
present discounted value,
V exA =
 
A   AN qexA

qexA   (FA + rEA)
r
; (6)
where interest rate r is used to discount future income.
With rm A the single supplier of the downstream market, the demand
equation is
qexA = N

A   pexA
A

: (7)
Firm As value-maximizing output, price, and value are given in Table 1, column
2, along with equilibrium consumer surplus (CS) and net social welfare (NSW ,
the sum of rm value and consumer surplus).
Note from Table 1 that rm As exclusion value satises
r
N
V exA
A
=
1
4
  kA
A
; (8)
where we write
ki =
Fi + rEi
N
(9)
for rm is xed and capitalized sunk entry cost relative to market size. If kA 
1
4A, rm A would never exclude rm B. So as not to rule out exclusion by
assumption, in what follows we assume
kA
A
<
1
4
: (10)
3.2 Nonintegration
If rm A operates only at the upstream level, rm B supplies the downstream
market and sets pB to maximize
V niB =
 
B   !B   BN qniB

qniB   (FA + rEA)
r
; (11)
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with
qniB = N

B   pniB
B

(12)
denoting the quantity demanded when rm B is the only supplier.
In stage II, rm A sets the wholesale price ! to maximize
V niA =
1
r
!Bq
ni
B (!) : (13)
The resulting wholesale price and other equilibrium characteristics are given in
Table 1, column 3.
3.3 Dual distribution
3.3.1 Stage III: Retail Prices
With dual distribution, rms A and B compete as price-setting duopolists in
stage III, the wholesale price ! having been set by rm A in stage II. Firm As
objective function is the present value of the sum of its prot from sales of the
nal good and its prot from sales to rm B of the essential input,
V dd3A =
1
r
[pAqA (pA; pB)  FA   rEA + !qB (pA; pB)] ; (14)
where qA (pA; pB) and qB (pA; pB) are the demand equations (3) and (4).
Firm Bs objective function is the present value of prot from its sales of the
nal good,
V dd3B =
1
r

(pB   !B) qdd3B (pA; pB)  (FB + rEB)

: (15)
Stage III noncooperative equilibrium prices as functions of !, along with the
corresponding quantities demanded, are given in the Appendix.
3.3.2 Stage II: Wholesale Price
In stage II, rm A picks ! to solve
max
!
V dd2A =
1
r

pA (!) q
dd2
A (!)  (FA + rEA) + !qdd2B (!)

: (16)
Two cases need to be considered, depending on whether the value of ! that
maximizes rm As value does or does not leave rm B with nonnegative value.
We rst consider the case in which the solution to (16) implies that rm Bs
dual-distribution participation constraint, V dd2B  0, is satised.
The value-maximizing wholesale price is
!dd =
1
2
1
8 + 2

8 +
3
R

; (17)
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and falls as R rises. Thus, the greater is the relative quality of the noninte-
grated rms variety, the more it is in rm As interest to increase the quantity
demanded of the nonintegrated rm, thereby raising derived demand for the
essential input.
Equilibrium outputs are
qddA = N
3
(1  2) (8 + 2)
" 
1  2  2 + 8
6
+   R
#
(18)
and
qddB =
N
1  2
2 + 2
8 + 2

R  
R

: (19)
Firm As duopoly output, (18), decreases as R rises, reaching zero for
RAZ =  +
 
1  2  8 + 2
6
: (20)
From (19) it follows that R >  is a condition for rm B to have positive
duopoly output.
Firm As equilibrium value, V ddA , satises
r
N
V ddA =
1
4
A +
1
1  2
A
(8 + 2)
(R  )2   kA: (21)
(21) can be rewritten in two ways that are useful.
First,
r
N
V ddA
A
=
1
4
+
1
N2
 
1  2  8 + 2
(2 + 2)
2 R
2
 
qddB
2   kA
A
: (22)
Thus rm As value rises as rm Bs equilibrium output rises, and rises more
rapidly, the greater is the relative quality of rm Bs variety, R. On the one
hand, ! and rm As own output both fall as R rises (see (17) and (18)). On
the other hand, however, rm Bs output rises as R rises (see (19)), and rm A
sells one unit of the essential input to rm B for every unit of output that rm
B sells. (21) shows that the latter e¤ect more than outweighs the rst two.
Alternatively, rm As duopoly value satises
V ddA   V exA
A
=
1
r
1
N
 
1  2  8 + 2
(2 + 2)
2 R
2
 
qddB
2  0: (23)
From (23), rm As duopoly value exceeds its exclusion value if rm B has
positive duopoly output.
Firm Bs equilibrium dual-distribution value satises
r
N
V ddB =
1
1  2

2 + 2
8 + 2
2
A (R  )2   kB : (24)
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Although rm B has positive duopoly output for R > , its duopoly value is
nonnegative only if R takes the larger value
R   + 8 + 
2
2 + 2
x  RB ; (25)
where we write
x =
s
(1  2) kB
A
(26)
for notational compactness.
By (19) and (23), for   R < RB , rm As dual distribution value would
exceed its exclusion value, but rm B would not accept to distribute its variety
of the product at the wholesale price !dd (equation (17)).
We can show that for values of R in the range R1  R  RB , where
R1 =  +
1
2

2 + 2   2
p
1  2

x; (27)
rm A enjoys greater value, compared with exclusion, by lowering ! enough
to allow rm B to break even under dual distribution. We refer to this regime
as constrained dual distribution (cdd). R1 is the value of R at which rm As
constrained dual-distribution value equals its exclusion value.
The appropriate formulation of rm As constrained value-maximization
problem is
max
!
V dd2A s.t. V
dd2
B  0: (28)
For R in this range, rm Bs participation constraint is binding, yielding the
wholesale price
!cdd =
1
2

2  2   R
1  2  
1
R
4  2
1  2x

; (29)
which is, as expected, smaller than !dd. If rm Bs participation constraint is
binding, rm As constrained dual distribution value satises
r
N
V cddA
A
=
r
N
V exA
A
+
1
4
2
(1  2)2
"
4x2
1  2
4
 

R     2 + 
2
2
x
2#
: (30)
3.4 Equilibrium Choice of Distribution Mode
Firm As dual distribution value satises (21). From Table 1, its nonintegration
value satises
r
N
V niA =
1
8
B =
1
8
AR
2: (31)
If rm Bs participation constraint is not binding, so that (16) is rm As
value-maximization problem, the di¤erence between rm As unconstrained
dual-distribution value and its nonintegration value satises
8
 
1  2  8 + 2
7 + 2
r
N
V ddA   V niA
A
=
10

R   8
7 + 2
2
+ 8
 
1  2  8 + 2
7 + 2

1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
  kA
A

: (32)
We have assumed kAA <
1
4 (see (10)). For notational compactness, write
RL =  +
1

" 
1  2  8 + 2
7 + 2
 
s
8
(1  2) (8 + 2)
7 + 2

kA
A
  1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
#
;
(33)
and
RH =  +
1

" 
1  2  8 + 2
7 + 2
+
s
8
(1  2) (8 + 2)
7 + 2

kA
A
  1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
#
:
(34)
RL and RH are the two values of R at which V ddA = V
ni
A (that is, they are
the values of R for which the right-hand side of (32) equals zero). It can be
shown that R1 < RB and RL < RAZ .
The relation between relative quality R and rm As value-maximizing dis-
tribution choice is of one of three types, depending on the magnitude of kA=A.
The cases are summarized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1L: low kAA : for
kA
A
 1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
; (35)
rm As value-maximizing distribution choices are
 0  R < R1: exclusion;
 R1  R  RB : dual distribution, rm Bs participation constraint bind-
ing;
 RB  R < RAZ : unconstrained dual distribution;
 R  RAZ : nonintegration.
Theorem 1M: intermediate kAA : for
1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
<
kA
A
<
1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
+
1
288
 
1  2  1 + 22  8 + 2
7 + 2
; (36)
rm As value-maximizing distribution choices are
 0  R < R1: exclusion;
 R1  R  RB : dual distribution, rm Bs participation constraint bind-
ing;
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 RB  R < RL: unconstrained dual distribution;
 RL  R < RH : nonintegration;
 RH  R < RAZ : unconstrained dual distribution;
 R  RAZ : nonintegration.
Theorem 1H: high : kAA : for
1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
+
1
288
 
1  2  1 + 22  8 + 2
7 + 2
 kA
A
 1
4
; (37)
rm As value-maximizing distribution choices are
 0  R < R1: exclusion;
 R1  R  RB : dual distribution, rm Bs participation constraint bind-
ing;
 RB  R < RL: unconstrained dual distribution;
 RL  RAZ : nonintegration.
If RB  RAZ for the low kA=A case, or RB  RL for the high kA=A case,
once again dual distribution does not occur: rm As optimal strategy passes
directly from exclusion to nonintegration at the value R = RXN at which rm
As exclusion value equals its nonintegration value. These cases may occur for
 su¢ ciently close to 1. Theorem 1 holds for  in the range where rm 1 will
opt for dual distribution for some values of R.14 In Figure 4 we illustrate rm
As choice of distribution mode for all .
Theorem 1L is illustrated in Figure 3, for an intermediate value of . For low
values of kA=A, rm A maximizes its value by excluding rm B for 0  R < R1.
For R1  R  RB , rm A maximizes value by setting its wholesale price
! so that rm B just breaks even under dual distribution.15 For R between
RB and RAZ , rm A maximizes its value by pricing the essential input at
its unconstrained value, thereby allowing rm B to realize positive value. For
R = RAZ , As dual-distribution output is zero; rm A distributes solely through
rm B for R  RAZ .
Note that there is a discontinuous drop in rm As value when it switches
from dual distribution to nonintegration. For R su¢ ciently close to RAZ , the
value of rm As downstream operation, articially considered as a stand-alone
14For  near 1, it may also happen (as illustrated in Figure 4) that as R rises from low levels,
rm As optimal distribution choice passes from exclusion to constrained dual distribution to
dual distribution, back to exclusion, and then to nonintegration. Theorem 1 holds for values
of  below this range.
15We make a tie-breaking assumption that if rm B earns a normal rate of return on
investment, it accepts to distribute the nal good.
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Figure 3: Low kA=A;  =
1
2 , N = 1000, r = 1=10; R =
p
B=A, VA =
rm As value; superscripts ex, cdd, dd, ni indicate exclusion, constrained dual
distribution, dual distribution, and nonintegration, respectively.
activity, is negative.16 However, it is nonetheless value-maximizing for rm A
to operate at the downstream level as long as its output is positive: the presence
of rm As variety on the downstream market limits the double-marginalization
that a¤ects rm Bs output.17 At R = RAZ , rm As dual-distribution drops
to zero. For higher values of R, the full double-marginalization e¤ect kicks in,
due to rm As nonintegration, and there is a discontinuous decline in rm As
equilibrium value.
16That is, r
N
V dsA
A
= pA
A
qA
N
  kA
A
< 0 for R su¢ ciently close to RAZ . This must be so,
since pA
A
approaches a positive value as R  ! RAZ , while (by denition of RAZ) qAN  ! 0
as R  ! RAZ .
17Discussing anticompetitive price squeezes  those that worsen market performance 
Motta and de Streel (2006, p. 115, footnote 59) discuss cross-subsidization of a retail division
by the wholesale division of a vertically-integrated rm. In our model, for R su¢ ciently close
to RAZ , cross-subsidization is not only privately protable for the integrated rm but also im-
proves market performance, by limiting double marginalization. Nor does cross-subsidization
make the nonintegrated rm unprotable; it makes the nonintegrated rm less protable than
would otherwise be the case, to the benet of consumers.
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Figure 4: Firm As choice of distribution mode, low kA, low kB , no transfer
price rule.
Figure 4 shows rm As value-maximizing choice of distribution mode in
(R; )-space for the case of Theorem 1L. The range of values of R consistent
with dual distribution narrows as varieties become closer substitutes. As noted
above, for  su¢ ciently close to 1, dual distribution is never rm As value-
maximizing choice.
Theorem 1H is illustrated in Figure 5. For high values of kA=A, as for low,
constrained dual distribution begins with R = R1, and unconstrained dual dis-
tribution begins with R = RB . As R rises from RB , dual distribution continues
to be rm As value-maximizing choice until R reaches RL, the smaller of two
values at which V ddA = V
ni
A . As R rises above RL, V
dd
A falls below V
ni
A , and for
high values of kA=A, V
dd
A < V
ni
A for R  RL. For high values of kA=A, rm A
opts out of dual distribution before its dual-distribution output goes to zero.18
The range of intermediate values of kA=A, for which Theorem 1M applies,
18A gure (corresponding to Figure 4) illustrating rm As value-maximizing choice of
distribution mode in (R; )-space for the case of Theorem 1H is given in an Appendix that is
available on request from the authors. The general conguration of the regions in (R; )-space
is similar to that of (R; )-space.
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Figure 5: Case III: high kA=A;  =
1
2 , N = 1000, r = 1=10; R =
p
B=A,
VA = rm As value; superscripts ex, cdd, dd, ni indicate internalization, con-
strained dual distribution, dual distribution, and nonintegration, respectively.
is a narrow one.19 Theorem 1M has in common with Theorem 1H that rm A
maximizes value by internalizing distribution for 0  R < R1 and opts for dual
distribution as R rises above RL. But for intermediate values of kA=A, RH , the
larger of the two values at which V ddA = V
ni
A , is less than RAZ . For R in the range
RH  R < RAZ , rm A once again maximizes value with dual distribution.
Theorem 1M has in common with Theorem 1L that as R approaches RAZ , rm
A loses value on its downstream operation if the downstream operation is viewed
as a stand-alone operation, but it is value-maximizing for the rm as a whole
to participate in the downstream market to mitigate double-marginalization by
rm B.
19We assume kA
A
 1
4
. Theorem 1M applies for values of kA
A
that fall in a range of
length 1
288
(1 2)(1+2)2(8+2)
7+2
. This length uctuates between 1.5 and 2 per cent of 1=4 for
approximately the range 0    0:7, and falls rapidly to zero for larger values of .
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3.5 Discussion
Note that we consider a situation in which all rms make entry decisions de novo.
Firm B makes its entry decision only after rm A has announced its wholesale
price. Contrast this with the case of a deus ex machina increase in the quality
of rm As variety (a reduction in R), after rm B has committed sunk assets,
and assume there is unconstrained dual distribution. Such a shift would result
in an increase in the unconstrained wholesale price !dd, in decreases in pA, pB ,
and in a decrease in rm Bs margin over variable cost, pB   !B .20 Firm Bs
margin over variable cost might remain su¢ cient to cover its average xed cost
but not the average capitalized value of sunk entry cost. Such a change would
appear to the owners of rm B to be a vertical price squeeze; from an economic
point of view, it would be more a stranded asset problem.21 A su¢ ciently great
reduction in R might make rm A switch to constrained dual distribution or
even to exclusion. In the latter case, this change, although nonstrategic, might
well reduce consumer welfare (it would certainly reduce consumer choice, from
two varieties to one). We therefore turn to the transfer price rule and its impact
on market performance.
4 The transfer price rule
In what follows, we focus on values of kAA for which Theorem 1L holds,
kA
A
 1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
;
so that in the absence of the transfer price rule, rm A would opt for constrained
or unconstrained dual distribution for R1  R  RAZ .
The transfer price rule requires that rm As downstream operation should
realize a nonnegative pseudo-prot in the counterfactual case that it has to
purchase the essential input on the same terms as rm B, that is 
pddA   !ddA

qddA   (FA + rEA)  0; (38)
with duo = dd; cdd, or equivalently that
r
N
bVAD
A
  kA
A
=
pduoA   !ddA
A
qduoA
N
  kA
A
 0; (39)
where bVAD is the pseudo-value of rm As downstream operation, before allow-
ing for capital cost.
20These comparative static changes are intuitive, and follow formally from results in the
Appendix.
21 If the owners of rm B paid sunk entry costs out of their own pockets, they would bear
the loss in value. If the owners of rm B nanced sunk entry costs and, being unable to make
interest payments, lost control of the rm, lenders would bear the loss in value. In either case
the assets, being sunk, would remain in the market.
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4.1 When would the TPR be a binding constraint?
We rst ask for what values of R, , and kAA the transfer price rule would
be a binding constraint. Considering rst the unconstrained dual distribution
regime, this requires us to analyze the gross pseudo-value function of rm As
downstream operation,
r
N
bVAD
A
=
3
2
2
(1  2) (8 + 2)2
(R  ) (2R+ ) (RAZ  R)
R
: (40)
The TPR is a binding constraint if
r
N
bVAD
A
 kA
A
; (41)
and the equality version of (41) is a cubic equation in R.
From (40), it appears that bVAD = 0 for two positive values of R, i.e., R = 
and R = RAZ . We can moreover show that bVAD rises from 0 at R = , attains
a maximum for a value R that lies between  and RAZ , and declines for larger
values of R.22 We can identify this value R and write the analytical expression
for the maximum value bV AD of rm As gross downstream pseudo-value.
If
r
N
bV AD
A
 kA
A
 1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
; (42)
the TPR is a binding constraint for all R that satisfy the condition of Theorem
1L. In what follows, we consider values of kAA that satisfy (42).
23
The lower bound of the unconstrained dual distribution range is R = RB ,
not R = . We have discussed R =  because it is a root of bVAD = 0. For
R < RB , the value of the wholesale price used to dene the pseudo-value of
rm As downstream operation is the constrained optimal value, !cdd, not !dd.
As R falls below RB , the relative quality of rm As variety increases, and the
pseudo-prot of rm As downstream division rises.
When there is constrained dual distribution, the transfer price rule is a
binding constraint for RcT < R < RB .24 For R < RcT , the relative quality of
rm As variety is su¢ ciently great that the transfer price rule ceases to be a
binding constraint (that is, (41) does not hold).
22That is, @
bVAD
@R

R=
> 0, @
bVAD
@R

R=RAZ
< 0, and @
2 bVAD
@R2
< 0.
23What if (42) is not satised? Recall that bV AD is an inverted-U-shaped function of R over
the range   R  RAZ . If kAA <
r
N
bV AD
A
, then the horizontal line at height kA
A
cuts this
function at two values of R, RbL and RbH . The TPR would be a binding constraint over the
ranges   R  RbL and RbH  R  RAZ . RbL and RbH are roots of a cubic equation. We
limit attention to values of kA
A
for which the TPR would bind throughout the relevant range
of R on the argument that if we understand how the TPR would a¤ect market performance
if it is a binding constraint over the entire range of R, then we will understand how it a¤ects
market performance when it is a binding constraint over only a subset of the relevant range
of R.
24RcT is a root of the equation
r
N
bVAD!cdd
A
= kA
A
.
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4.2 If the TPR is a binding constraint
If the TPR is a binding constraint, rm A will set ! and pA so that the constraint
holds with equality,
pA
A
qA
N
  kA
A
= !
qA
N
: (43)
To do otherwise would involve a needless sacrice of value.
Substituting for stage III values of pAA and
qA
N as functions of ! in (43) yields
a quadratic equation that determines the TPR-constrained value of !. Given
this value !TPR, all stage III quantities of interest are determined.
The TPR obliges rm A to set a price pA and wholesale price per unit of
quality ! so that its downstream operation breaks even in the counterfactual,
pseudo-value sense. Although the TPR forces rm A to act as if its downstream
operation pays !A per unit of the essential input, rm A still bases its distrib-
ution choice on its actual (but TPR-constrained) dual-distribution value. Thus
one should expect that the imposition of the TPR will change the values of R
at which rm As optimal distribution option will shift from exclusion to dual
distribution to nonintegration.25 ;26
Figure 6 shows rm As value-maximizing choice of distribution mode in
(R; )-space, if rm A is subject to the TPR. The regions in which rm A
would opt for alternative distribution modes have the general conguration of
the no-TPR regime (Figure 4). If the TPR is in place, the transition from the
range of Rs where rm Bs participation constraint is binding to the region in
which rm Bs participation constraint is not binding and the transition from
dual distribution to nonintegration take place at lower values of R than when
there is no TPR, for a given value of . With the TPR, the dual distribution
region ends at a lower level of  than without the TPR.
4.3 Numerical analysis
There are no analytical solutions if the TPR is a binding constraint. We illus-
trate the consequences of the TPR for parameter values27 that are central in
25 In its 1967 Schwinn decision (U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. et al. 388 U.S. 365
(1967)), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Schwinn could not impose nonprice restraints on
independent distributors that had taken title to bicycles intended for resale. Following this
decision, Schwinn internalized the distribution function, cutting o¤ distributors with which it
had had decades-long relationships.
26EU competition policy holds that a dominant rm cannot deny an existing customer
normal supplies merely because the dominant rm decides to enter a downstream market
(Commercial Solvents (Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and
Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223.)). But GlaxoSmithKline/Spain (Glaxo-
SmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission Case C 501/06 P 17 December 2008) contains
a recognition that it is not useful to place a rm, even a dominant rm, in a situation where
its options are to lose money or to withdraw from a market entirely. The implications of these
precedents, as is or in combination with the TPR, for distribution choices by dominant rms
under EU competition policy, are unclear.
27The parameter values used for Figures (7)-(9) are kA = kB = 1=40,  = 1=2, A = 1.
The latter is a normalization. Given A = 1, B varies with R. Other parameters (r, N)
cancel out in the expressions for the ratios that are shown in the gures.
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Figure 6: Firm As choice of distribution mode, when subject to the transfer
price rule, low kA, low kB .
the sense that for these values, rm A will opt for exclusion, dual distribution,
or nonintegration, depending on R. We examine the consequences of the TPR
for rm As choice of distribution mode and for market performance. We also
discuss qualitative changes in the results for other sets of parameter values.
4.3.1 Low kA, kB
Figures (7)-(9) show the impact of the TPR on rm values, on wholesale and
retail prices, and on consumer surplus and net social welfare,28 respectively.
For each variable, the gures show the TPR-constrained value as a fraction of
the corresponding no-TPR value.
For these parameter values, the TPR is a binding constraint for RcT  R 
RAZ . For R < RcT , the relative quality of rm As variety is so great that its
downstream unit would have a positive pseudo-value at ! = !cdd. At the other
extreme, for R  RAZ , rm A would opt for nonintegration in any case, since
its dual-distribution output is zero.
28Net social welfare is the sum of rm values and the present-discounted value of consumer
surplus.
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Figure 7: Relative rm values, with TPR relative to without TPR, low kA, kB .
See text for explanation of regions of the horizontal axis.
As shown in Figure 7(a), the TPR reduces rm As value for all RcT 
R  RAZ . When the TPR is imposed, rm A chooses dual distribution for
RcT  R  Rdn, where Rdn is the relative quality level at which rm A switches
from dual distribution to nonintegration if it is subject to the TPR.29 Without
the TPR, however, rm A would choose dual distribution subject to rm Bs
participation constraint for RcT  R  RB , and would choose dual distribution
for RB  R  RAZ . For Rdn < RAZ , rm A would choose nonintegration if sub-
ject to the TPR but dual distribution without the TPR. The imposition of the
TPR changes rm As incentives and induces it to withdraw from distribution
at a lower relative quality level than is the case without the TPR.
Correspondingly, the TPR increases rm Bs relative value for all RcT <
R  Rdn and for much of the range Rdn  R  RAZ .30 For low levels of R
in that range, the absolute level of rm Bs value (with or without the TPR)
29Rdn must be solved for numerically. See the discussion in the Appendix that is available
on request from the authors.
30Figure 7(b) shows rm Bs relative rm value for RB < R  RAZ . Firm B has positive
TPR-constrained value for RcT  R  RB . Over this range, it is the constrained dual
distribution regime that reigns in the absence of the TPR, and rm Bs value is zero.
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Figure 8: Relative wholesale and retail prices, with TPR relative to without
TPR, low kA, kB . See text for explanation of regions of the horizontal axis.
is small, but the relative increase in rm Bs value under the TPR is large. As
long as rm A nds it optimal to integrate forward, the TPR further increases
rm Bs value. If rm A does not integrate forward, it sets a relatively high
!,31 and rm Bs value is essentially what it would be without the TPR (the
ratio shown in Figure 7(b) is near 1).
Underlying the value changes shown in Figure 7 are the changes in !, pA,
and pB shown in Figure 8. As long as rm A integrates forward, the TPR
obliges it to lower the price of rm Bs essential input. It is to be expected that
where ! leads, pB follows, and this is indeed the case. As is also to be expected
in price-setting duopoly, as the equilibrium value of pB falls, the equilibrium
value of pA falls as well. But if the TPR induces rm A to withdraw from
distribution, there are modest relative increases in both ! and pB .
The changes in relative consumer surplus and relative net social welfare
shown in Figure 9 mirror the price changes shown in Figure 8. If the TPR is in
place, for values of R for which dual distribution is rm As value-maximizing
choice, the TPR substantially increases consumer surplus, and increases net
social welfare as well. For values of R that induce rm A not to integrate into
distribution under the TPR, the TPR signicantly reduces consumer surplus,
and reduces net social welfare as well.
31Without an operating downstream division, rm A is not constrained in its choice of !.
The impact of the TPR is to change rm As choice of distribution mode.
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Assessment To cast these results in the light most favorable to the transfer
price rule, one might argue that one should expect values of R modestly greater
than 1  a local supplier is probably more in tune with the local market than
would be a division of an integrated (perhaps multinational) rm  but not
substantially so. For the simulations discussed above, RcT is slightly smaller
than 1, RB slightly more than 1, and Rdn slightly larger than 2. R in the
neighborhood of 2 implies B is roughly 4 times A. Probably one would not
expect the maximum reservation price for a local variety to be more than four
times the maximum reservation price of the variety of an integrated rm. If
this expectation is valid, the transfer price rule would have a moderate positive
e¤ect on consumer surplus and on net social welfare.
Evidently, however, this argument is conditional on rm A integrating into
distribution if subject to the transfer price rule. If, under the inuence of
the TPR, rm A does not integrate into distribution, double marginalization
implies a worsening of market performance. We turn, therefore, to discussion
of the impact of the transfer price rule for other sets of parameter values, in
particular larger ks.
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4.3.2 Robustness
The transfer price rule requires rm A to set ! and pA in such a way that
its downstream unit would at least break even as a stand-alone entity paying
the same wholesale price per unit of quality as rm B. The downstream rms
revenue must cover its xed cost and a normal rate of return on its sunk entry
cost. It is not surprising, therefore, that simulation results are sensitive to the
value chosen for kA, rm As xed cost and normal return on entry cost per
capital. Holding other parameter values xed (including kA = 1=40) and making
kB four times as large as kA (that is, kB = 1=10, near the maximum value
consistent with constraints) does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
If the TPR is imposed, for su¢ ciently low values of R (RcT < R < Rdn), rm A
opts for dual distribution with ! set at its TPR-constrained value. For R in this
range, rm As value is reduced. All other welfare elements, including net social
welfare, increase. But the TPR induces rm A to opt for nonintegration at a
much lower level of R than would otherwise be the case (indeed, Rdn < RAZ). If
rm A is not integrated into distribution, double marginalization has a negative
impact on both consumer surplus and on net social welfare.
If, in contrast, kB (= 1=40) and all other parameters are held at the values
of Section 4.3.1, but if kA is made four times as large as kB (that is, 1=10), then
rm A, if subject to the TPR, never maximizes value with dual distribution.
It excludes rm B for all values of R for which there would be constrained
dual distribution, and for part of the range of R for which there would be
unconstrained dual distribution, without the TPR. Due to the imposition of
the TPR, nonintegration is rm As value-maximizing choice at a much lower
relative quality level than would otherwise be the case.
When the TPR induces rm A to exclude, rm As value, consumer surplus,
and net social welfare are all reduced.32 For higher R, but well within the range
of R that would result in dual distribution without the TPR, rm A maximizes
value by nonintegration if subject to the TPR. This increases rm Bs value,
relative to the situation without the TPR, but reduces rm As value, consumer
surplus, and net social welfare.
If kA and kB are both increased by a factor of four (that is, kA = kB = 1=10),
holding other parameter values at previous levels, results are qualitatively the
same as if kA alone is at the higher level (kA = 1=40, kB = 1=10).
In short, positive arguments for the TPR can be made, if the quality of rm
Bs variety is only moderately greater than the quality of rm As variety and
rm A has relatively low xed cost and sunk entry cost. However, the impact of
the TPR on market performance is entirely negative if rm A has high xed cost
and sunk entry cost, relative to the size of the market. In such cases, the e¤ect
of the TPR is to short-circuit competition. For low R, only rm As variety is
available to nal consumers while only rm Bs variety, admittedly of higher
quality, is available to nal consumers. But double marginalization makes rm
Bs variety available on terms that leave consumers worse o¤ than would be the
case absent the TPR.
32With internalization, rm B does not operate.
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Economics
What we see is that the transfer price rule improves market performance as
long as rm A remains in the downstream market. If rm A does not integrate
forward into distribution, the transfer price rule worsens market performance,
for values of R for which rm A would opt for dual distribution, without the
TPR but for nonintegration with the TPR. These results are consistent with
empirical evidence (Lafontaine and Slade, 2005, p. 21):
While di¤erent theoretical models often yield diametrically opposed
predictions as to the welfare e¤ects of vertical restraints, we nd
that in the setting that we focus on, namely manufacturer/retailer
or franchisor/franchisee relationships, the empirical evidence con-
cerning the e¤ects of vertical restraints on consumer well-being is
surprisingly consistent. Specically, it appears that when manu-
facturers choose to impose such restraints, not only do they make
themselves better o¤, but they also typically allow consumers to
benet from higher quality products and better service provision.
5.2 Policy implications
The words of Section 2 of the Sherman Act refer to monopolization. The life
that judicial interpretation has breathed into this clay deals with conduct that
is exclusionary. The Article 102 EU Treaty prohibition of abuse of a dominant
position is more complex, touching on exclusionary conduct but also on the
exercise of market power and evincing a special responsibility of dominant rms
to conduct themselves in such a way that competition in the single market is
not distorted.
The question of the appropriate antitrust treatment of vertical pricing is inti-
mately related to the evolution of antitrust policy from reliance on competition
tout court to get good market performance33 to an explicit evaluation of the
impact of business practices on market performance in general and consumer
welfare in particular.
Here the implications of our model are ambiguous, in the following sense.
For some parameter values, the TPR improves market performance (consumer
surplus and net social welfare) by altering the terms of competition (rivalry)
between integrated and nonintegrated rms. This would suggest imposing the
TPR as a means of promoting competition. But for other parameter values,
imposing the TPR worsens market performance, either by inducing the up-
stream rm to withdraw from distribution or by inducing the upstream rm
to internalize distribution, in both cases reducing competition in the sense of
rivalry.
33This can be traced to the 1904 Northern Securities decision (193 U.S. 197 (1904)).
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The tension here is that competitionwill sometimes improve market per-
formance and sometimes worsen it, but explicit evaluation of the welfare impact
of the transfer price rule on market performance in particular circumstances
would seem, as a practical matter, to be beyond the competence of courts to
carry out.
For U.S. antitrust policy, a suggested resolution of the tension between re-
liance on competition and explicit evaluation of the impact of (in this case) the
TPR on market performance may be found in Posners (2001, pp. 194195)
view that the proper target of Section 2 is business conduct that would exclude
equally e¢ cient competitors. In this perspective, a vertically-integrated rm
that sells an essential input to nonintegrated downstream rms with which it
also competes is more e¢ cient than those downstream rms because it is verti-
cally integrated.34 It may be that because the integrated rm has a cost/quality
advantage vis-à-vis its nonintegrated downstream customer/rival, it is protable
for it to set a wholesale price that makes the downstream rm unprotable. But
the protability of such a wholesale price is not strategic in the sense of being
conditional on the exit of the downstream rival.
In the absence of exclusionary behavior upstream, the upstream market will
reach an equilibrium market structure dictated by the size of the upstream mar-
ket and nature the upstream technology. If that equilibrium market structure
is a monopoly (which may well be the case for the telecommunications markets
that have been home to recent price squeeze complaints) that may be an ar-
gument for regulation.35 It is not, or at least, our model does not make it, an
argument for altering the terms of rivalry between integrated and nonintegrated
rms when the implications of such alteration for market performance can be
seen only through a glass darkly.36
6 Appendix
Here we state results. Derivations are given in a separate appendix available on
request from the authors.
34See also Motta and de Streel (2006, pp. 115116, emphasis in original): Thus, only a
margin squeeze that excludes a competitor that is more e¢ cient than the vertically integrated
rm would be anticompetitive and should be condemned.
35 In the 1990 Town of Concord case (915 F. 2d 17 (1st Cir., 1990)), then-Judge Breyer wrote
a decision to the e¤ect that regulation precluded consideration of price squeeze allegations as
an antitrust violation.
36The implications of our model for the role of the TPR in EU competition policy, with
its recessive gene that would have dominant rms act as if they operated in a competitive
market, are less obvious. It seems clear, however, that the rst part of the argument the U.S.
Supreme Court used to partition alleged price squeeze into upstream exercise of market
power and alleged predationwill not y for EU competition policy. In principle, honored
perhaps more often in the breach than the observance, the exercise of market power is an
abuse of a dominant position.
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6.1 Table 1
Column 1 of Table 1 is the monopoly outcome, with demand determined by the
quality of rm As variety. Column 2 is the double marginalization outcome,
with demand determined by the quality of rm Bs variety.
6.2 Dual distribution
Inverse demands are given by equation (2), for i, j = A;B and i 6= j. The
corresponding demand equations are
qA =
N
1  2

A   pA
A
  
r
B
A
(1  !) B   (pB   !B)
B

(44)
and
qB =
N
1  2

(1  !) B   (pB   !B)
B
  
r
A
B
A   pA
A

: (45)
6.2.1 Stage III
! is given, having been determined in stage II. Values V dd3A and V
dd3
B satisfy
1  2
N
 
rV dd3A + FA + rEA

=
pA

A   pA
A
  
r
B
A
(1  !) B   (pB   !B)
B

+
!B

B   pB
B
  
r
A
B
A   pA
A

(46)
and
1  2
N
 
rV dd3B + FB + rEB

=
(pB   !B)

(1  !) B   (pB   !B)
B
  
r
A
B
A   pA
A

; (47)
respectively.
The rst-order conditions to maximize V dd3A and V
dd3
B are
2
pA
A
  
r
B
A
pB   !B
B
= 1  
r
B
A
+ 2
r
B
A
! (48)
and
 
r
A
B
pA
A
+ 2
pB   !B
B
= 1  
r
A
B
  !; (49)
respectively.
Equilibrium price-cost margins satisfy 
4  2 pA
A
=
 
2  2 R + 3R! (50)
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and  
4  2 pB   !B
B
=
 
2  2  
R
  2  1  2!: (51)
Where the rst-order conditions hold, quantities demanded are
qA =
N
1  2

pA
A
 R!

(52)
and
qB =
N
1  2
pB   !B
B
: (53)
Values as functions of ! satisfy 
1  2  4  22
N
 
rV dd2A + FA + rEA

= A
 
2  2  R2
+
 
1  28 + 3
R

!B  
 
1  2  8 + 2!2B (54)
and
1  2
N
 
rV dd2B + FB + rEB

= B

pB   !B
B
2
: (55)
6.2.2 !
The rst-order condition to maximize V dd2 gives rm As optimal wholesale
price, (17). Substituting (17) in the appropriate stage 3 expressions gives stage
II equilibrium values.
Price-cost margins are
pIIIA
A
=
1
2
1
8 + 2
 
8  2 + 2R (56)
and
pIIIB   !B
B
=
2 + 2
8 + 2

1  
R

: (57)
Quantities demanded are (18) and (19).
Values satisfy
4
 
1  2  8 + 2
N
 
rV dd2A + FA + rEA

=
A
 
8  32   4   8R + 4R2 (58)
and
1  2
N
 
rV dd2B + FB + rEB

=

2 + 2
8 + 2
2
B

1  
R
2
: (59)
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6.3 Transfer Price Rule
The transfer price rule requires that rm As downstream unit make a nonnega-
tive pseudo-prot in the counterfactual case that it purchases the essential input
at the same price as rm B. The transfer price rule is a binding constraint if
(pA   !A) qA < FA + rEA; (60)
where the left-hand side is evaluated for unconstrained equilibrium values.
Equilibrium values satisfy
qA
N
=
3
(1  2) (8 + 2)
" 
1  2  8 + 2
6
  (R  )
#
(61)
pA   (cA + !) A
A
=
 (R  ) (2R+ )
2 (8 + 2)R
; (62)
and the transfer price rule is a binding constraint if
3
2
2
(1  2) (8 + 2)2
(R  ) (2R+ )
R
" 
1  2  8 + 2
6
  (R  )
#
<
kA
A
(63)
or alternatively if

2 (8 + 2)
(R  ) (2R+ )
R

1
2
  3
(1  2) (8 + 2) (R  )

<
kA
A
: (64)
The range of relative qualities consistent with dual distribution di¤ers as
kA
A
 14 3+
2
7+2 or
kA
A
> 14
3+2
7+2 . Consider each case in turn.
Small kAA There is a range of R consistent with dual distribution if
RB =  +
8 + 2
2 + 2
s
1  2
A
kB   +
 
1  2  2 + 8
6
; (65)
or equivalently if  
2 + 2
2  
1  2
362
>
kB
A
: (66)
If this condition is not met, rm As equilibrium distribution choice as R
rises switches directly from refusal to deal to nonintegration. Assume (66) holds,
and consider the left-hand side of (64) over the maximum possible range of R,
  R   +
 
1  2  2 + 8
6
: (67)
The left-hand-side of (64) is zero forR =  (sinceR =  makes pA cAA !AA =
0), and zero for R = + (
1 2)(2+8)
6 (since this value of R makes
qA
N = 0). The
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rst derivative of the left-hand side of (64) is positive for R =  and negative
for R =  + (
1 2)(2+8)
6 . The second derivative of the left-hand side of (64) is
negative. Over the relevant range of R, the left-hand side of (64) thus begins
at zero, rises to a maximum, and falls to zero again, taking a single maximum
value. If this maximum value is less than kAA , the transfer price rule is a binding
constraint for all R. If this maximum value is greater than kAA , the transfer price
rule is binding for large values of R, and possibly for low values of R, depend-
ing on the di¤erence between RB and . Consideration of numerical examples
shows that all cases can occur.
Large kAA The lower limit of the relevant range of R is the same for the large-
kA
A
and the small-kAA cases. By subtraction, the upper limit of the range of R
for the large kAA case is less than the upper limit of R in the small
kA
A
case.
Considering (64), the transfer pricing rule is binding for all admissible R for the
large kAA case if
1
4
3 + 2
7 + 2
  
2 (8 + 2)
(R  ) (2R+ )
R

1
2
  3
(1  2) (8 + 2) (R  )

> 0:
(68)
Graphical analysis and evaluation of the left-hand-side of (68) for 0    1
and 0:25  R  2 shows that this condition is always met. The transfer price
rule is always a binding constraint for large kAA .
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